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This short note briefly explores (a variant of) a method for electing a par-
liament by means of approval voting. Phragme´n’s standard sequential method
[1, 2, 3] is a method of this kind that generalizes D’Hondt’s rule: every step
proceeds so as to minimize the maximum representation. What about similarly
generalizing Sainte-Lague¨’s rule, i. e. minimizing the variance at every step?
1. We’ll follow the notation of [3]. Assume that n seats have already been as-
signed, and that each elector of type k is represented in the amount rk. We con-
sider allocating a new seat to candidate (or party) i and distributing it between
the electors that approved i. Let xk be the amount of this new seat that is
given to each elector of type k (we are omitting the reference to i). The xk are
subject to the following constraints:
xk ≥ 0, for all k (1)
xk = 0, for k 6√ i (2)∑
k
√
i
ukxk = 1, (3)
The variance (multiplied by w) of the new distribution is
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where we have used (2). So it suffices to minimize the value of
φi =
1
2
∑
k
√
i
uk
(
2rkxk + x
2
k
)
, (5)
We will now minimize this value for each candidate i and then will minimize
the result with respect to i.
Introducing a Lagrange multiplier ρ to deal with the constraint (3), we have
to solve the following system of (linear) equations, where the unknonws are xk
for k
√
i and ρ:
∂φi/∂xk − ρuk = uk(rk + xk)− ρuk = 0. for each k √ i, (6)
together with equation (3). Summing (6) for all k
√
i and using (3) one gets(∑
k
√
i
ukrk
)
+ 1− ρwi = 0, (7)
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where we are using the notation wi =
∑
k
√
i uk, as in [3]. So we get
ρ =
(∑
k
√
i ukrk
)
+ 1
wi
=: ρi, (8)
which introduced in (6) results in the new representations being
rk + xk = ρi =
(∑
k
√
i ukrk
)
+ 1
wi
, for each k
√
i, (9)
where the right-hand side does not depend on k
√
i. Notice that this value is
exactly the one that appears in equation (29) of [3].
Now we have to minimize φi with respect to i. By introducing (9) in (5), we
get
2φi =
∑
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√
i
uk(ρi − rk)(ρi + rk) =
∑
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√
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uk(ρ
2
i − r2k) = wiρ2i −
∑
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ukr
2
k, (10)
where ρi is the value given by (8).
So, it is a matter of choosing the i that minimizes (10) and distributing this
new seat according to (9). This is valid under the assumption that the obtained
xk satisfy (1). Unfortunately, it is not always so, which issue will be considered
in a while.
2. In the case of closed party lists this algorithm reduces indeed to Sainte-
Lague¨’s rule. In fact, every elector who approves party i has a representation
rk = ni/wi. And their total representation is
∑
k
√
i ukrk = ni (since
∑
k
√
i uk =
wi). By plugging this into (8), we get ρi = (ni + 1)/wi. And by plugging all
this into (10), we get
2φi =
(ni + 1)
2
wi
− n
2
i
wi
=
2ni + 1
wi
, (11)
whose minimization gives Sainte-Lague¨’s algorithm.
3. As we have already said, sometimes the above obtained distribution does not
satisfy the positiveness constraint (1) (in contrast to the Phragme´n’s standard
sequential method, where positivity is guaranteed by [3, Prop. 7.4]). An example
of such a failure is provided by the following profile
9 : a1, a2, 1 : a1, a2, b, 3 : b, c. (12)
In this case, for n = 3 the preceding computations lead to the following assign-
ment:
Seat # i 9 : a1, a2 1 : a1, a2, b 3 : b, c
1 a1 0.1000 0.1000 0.0000
2 b 0.0000 0.1750 0.2750
3 a2 0.1175 −0,0575 0.0000
2
Such cases can be corrected by explicitly imposing a constraint xk = 0
whenever the above computations lead to a negative value of xk, as if the electors
k hadn’t approved candidate i. In the preceding example, this results in the
following assignment
Seat # i 9 : a1, a2 1 : a1, a2, b 3 : b, c
1 a1 0.1000 0.1000 0.0000
2 b 0.0000 0.1750 0.2750
3 a2 0.1111 0.0000 0.0000
Anyway, it remains to be checked whether such a correction will always give
the exact minimizer of the original problem.
4. Like the standard sequential Phragme´n’s method, the party version of the
present variation also lacks monotonicity. The following example is similar to
(48) of [3, §7.5]:
4 : A, 1 : B, 3 : C, 9 : A,B, 3 : B, C. (13)
For n = 3 this profile gives 2 seats to A, whereas adding one vote that approves
only A, i. e. changing the coefficients to (5, 1, 3, 9, 3), results in this party getting
only 1 seat.
5. On the other hand, for two parties, the limit n → ∞ shows a Cantorian
staircase phenomenon similar to that of [3, §7.7]. For instance, the next figure
shows the dependence of f1200 on α for ζ = 0.376.
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6. Summing up, except for the fact of its being indeed a generalization of Sainte-
Lague¨’s rule, this method doesn’t seem especially interesting in comparison with
Phragme´n’s standard sequential method. The rather undesirable phenomena of
the preceding paragraphs are still present. And the fact that positivity is not
immediately satisfied is quite annoying.
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